Electronic Surveillance of the Grand Jury Witness: Detering Fourth Amendment Violations Intended to Produce Conviction of Someone Other Than the Victim by Editors,
[Vol.120
COMMENT
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF THE GRAND JURY
WITNESS: DETERRING FOURTH AMENDMENT VIO-
LATIONS INTENDED TO PRODUCE CONVICTION
OF SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE VICTIM
At various times the Supreme Court has ascribed to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule 1 at least three different purposes: relief
for the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure; 2 deterrence of
future fourth amendment violations; ' and maintenance of judicial in-
tegrity.4 At the same time the Court has developed standing rules
which limit the class of persons who must be allowed to invoke the
exclusionary rule by making a motion to suppress evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment. The standing doctrine apparently
reflects the belief of most courts that not all evidence obtained by un-
reasonable searches and seizures should be suppressed. As the law now
stands, only persons whose own fourth amendment rights have been
violated-"victims"-may object to the introduction of such evidence.'
The fourth amendment standing requirement is sometimes said to
derive from the general principle that a party may not claim constitu-
tional protection unless he "belongs to the class for whose sake the
constitutional protection is given." 6 It thus appears most compatible
with an exclusionary rule whose purpose is remedial and whose justi-
fication depends on a view that the fourth amendment right involved
is personal. But the Supreme Court has increasingly asserted that the
rule's principal, if not exclusive, justification is deterrence.' If deter-
rence is the exclusionary rule's purpose, one may well wonder whether
all unconstitutionally obtained evidence should not be excluded, since
I In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court held that
evidence seized in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights must be excluded
from his trial in federal court. This result had been foreshadowed by Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Court
extended the rule by holding that the fruits of illegally seized evidence must also be
excluded. Later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that the
exclusionary rule must be applied by the states, the fourth amendment applying to
their conduct by virtue of its incorporation in the fourteenth amendment.
2 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Connolly v. Medalie, 58
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
3 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ; Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968); Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 482 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
6 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
7 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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the standing rule obviously tempers the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule in some circumstances.
Although Supreme Court opinions hold that one whose own fourth
amendment rights have not been violated lacks standing to invoke the
exclusionary rule,' the Court has not defined the circumstances under
which a victim may invoke the rule. While a victim who is also a
criminal defendant may raise an exclusionary rule claim, it is not clear
whether a victim who is not and will not become a criminal defendant
may invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. With the enact-
ment of title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,9
and more particularly with the advent of its broad immunity pro-
visions,1" this issue is now being raised for the first time-and is being
done so within the context of grand jury proceedings. Witnesses in
grand jury proceedings who, because of a grant of immunity, may not
assert fifth amendment claims, have recently argued that as victims of
illegal wiretapping, they may raise statutory and fourth amendment
claims."
These claims have presented difficult questions concerning the
proper construction of title III, which prohibits electronic surveillance
not in accordance with specific procedural rules,12 provides for the ex-
clusion of illegally obtained evidence from both court and grand jury
proceedings,' 3 and permits suppression motions by "aggrieved per-
sons." 14 In addition these claims have challenged courts to reexamine
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in order, perhaps, to formulate
sensible, pragmatic criteria for determining when the rule should apply.
After discussing the principal cases, this Comment will consider
separately title III and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule as ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court to determine whether they supply a
basis for the application of the exclusionary rule to witnesses in grand
jury proceedings.
I. THE CASES
In United States ex rel. Rosado v. Flood 5 a state grand jury
witness, jailed for contempt when he refused to answer questions despite
8 See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) [hereinafter denominated Safe Streets Act]. All
undesignated §§ will be references to this title.
o18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
11 In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. United
States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256) ; In re Maratea,
444 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1971) ; In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
12 18 U.S.C. §2511 (1970).
13 Id. § 2515.
14Id. § 2518(10) (a). An "aggrieved person" is "a person who was a party to
any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception
was directed." Id. § 2510(11).
15 394 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
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a grant of immunity, petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that compelling him to reveal the substance of intercepted tele-
phone communications to which he had been a party violated the
Federal Communications Act 1 6 and the fourth amendment. Affirming
the district court's denial of the petition, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit noted that, as to the first claim, in Schwartz v. Texas 7
the Supreme Court had limited application of its rule excluding evidence
obtained in violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act to the federal courts. As to the second claim, however, a year
earlier, in Katz v. United States,'" the Supreme Court had declared
unauthorized electronic eavesdropping to be an illegal search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, which, together with its
exclusionary rule, was binding on the states. 9 But, the court of ap-
peals ruled, the district court did not have to consider the legality of
the interception and the propriety of its suppression because Rosado
was a grand jury witness, not an indicted defendant:
[W] e do not find it necessary to resolve these difficult issues
[concerning the effect of Katz]. Rosado is not, nor ap-
parently is he likely to be, an indicted defendant; he is merely
a witness before a grand jury. It has traditionally been held
that such a witness usually cannot impede collection of evi-
dence by the grand jury even though the issues he seeks to
raise could later be litigated-perhaps with success-by an
indicted defendant . . . . The rationale of this doctrine is
that the scope of a grand jury inquiry "is not to be limited
narrowly," because it is "an important investigative
instrument." 20
Because Rosado was decided prior to enactment of title III of the
Safe Streets Act,2 ' it has nothing to say concerning the statutory scheme
behind current controversies about the admission of such evidence.
Section 2515 of title III on its face unequivocally excludes from federal
and state grand jury proceedings all evidence derived from illegal
electronic eavesdropping:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been inter-
cepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no
16 47 U.S.C. § 605.
17344 U.S. 199 (1952).
18389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 394 F.2d at 141.
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). Additionally, Rosado involved a witness before
a state grand jury. Because of federal court reluctance to interfere with state
criminal process, cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the rule might be
different in the case of a witness before a federal grand jury. See In re Egan, 450
F.2d 199, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub norn. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990
(1971).
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evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States,
a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of
that information would be in violation of this chapter.
22
Section 2518(10) (a) of the same title permits suppression motions by
"aggrieved persons": 23
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in
or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the con-
tents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evi-
dence derived therefrom ... 2
The extent to which these provisions authorize a grand jury wit-
ness to resist government questioning on the basis of the source of its
information arose in Carter v. United States.25 There, federal grand
jury witnesses appealing from contempt convictions claimed that they
were members of the Black Panther Party, that telephone conversations
of their president, Bobby Seale, had been illegally intercepted, and that
the questions put to them were based on the information thus obtained.
Citing Rosado, and making no reference to the broad statutory pro-
visions of title III, the Ninth Circuit concluded: "As witnesses, they
have no standing to question the source of the government's informa-
tion. It will be time enough to do that if any of them should ever
become a defendant, a most unlikely event in view of the immunity
granted them." 26
In its language denying grand jury witnesses the benefits of the
exclusionary rule, the court in Carter spoke unusually and unnecessarily
broadly; a much narrower rule, and perhaps the one for which the case
should be read, would have disposed of the case on the ground that the
appellants, objecting to the interception of Seale's communications
rather than their own, had failed to show their status as victims of
illegal search and seizure.
2218 U.S.C. §2515 (1970).
23 See note 14 supra.
24 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970). The omission of "grand jury" and "legis-
lative committee," both of which are specifically included in § 2515, will be discussed
below. See text accompanying notes 62-82 infra.
25 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970).
26 Id. at 388.
27 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman the Court
declared:
The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights
were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by
the introduction of damaging evidence.
Id. at 171-72.
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Although the Ninth Circuit has followed its decision in Carter,28
the Third Circuit has ruled differently in the case of Sister Joques
Egan,2" a member of the order of Sacred Heart of Mary, who allegedly
conspired with at least six others to blow up government buildings in
the District of Columbia and kidnap Presidential advisor Henry
Kissinger.
In January 1971, a federal grand jury sitting in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, called upon Sister Egan to testify. Having refused on
fifth amendment grounds, she was granted immunity from prosecution
and ordered to appear before the grand jury forthwith."0 Before the
grand jury and again before the court, Sister Egan still refused to
testify, asserting as a justification that her subpoena and questioning
resulted from information obtained by illegal eavesdropping directed
at her. The court found Sister Egan in contempt and ordered that
she be held in prison until she testified or until the end of the life of
the grand jury.
On appeal, the Third Circuit first affirmed Sister Egan's contempt
conviction. Then, on rehearing en banc, it reversed, holding the con-
tempt conviction improper under title 111.31 Although the majority
disagreed on whether Sister Egan had standing under section 2518
28 See Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971) ; United States v.
Gelbard, 443 F2d 837 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
29 In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub norn. United States v.
Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
30 The grant of immunity involved substantial maneuvering on the part of the
government, probably because the statutory authority is questionable. Immunity was
first proferred under 18 U.S.C. §§6002-03 (1970). When Sister Egan's counsel
argued that this was not commensurate with the breadth required by the fifth amend-
ment privilege, the district court disagreed and ordered Sister Egan to testify the
next day. The government changed its own position overnight and presented a new
immunity application, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2514 (1970), the next morning. Refusing
to allow defense counsel time to prepare argument on the applicability of that section,
the court again ordered Sister Egan to testify.
The problems posed in this Comment depend on the unavailability of a fifth
amendment privilege for grand jury witnesses, and thus depend on the constitutionality
and applicability of the immunity statutes. Because the "use" immunity of §6002 is
under a constitutional cloud, see Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954, cert. granted,
402 U.S. 971 (1971), the applicability of §2514 is pivotal to the problem. Although
the issue will not be treated here, it should be noted that the section applies to a
limited number of defined offenses, and it is doubtful that the list covers the cases in
the text in which it was held applicable. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2514, 2516 (1970). Fur-
ther, the section is repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, §§227(a), 260, 84 Stat. 930, 931, effective 4 years and 60 days after the
enactment date, October 15, 1970. 18 U.S.C. §2514 (1970).
31 In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971). Judge Adams, with whom Judge Hastie joined, wrote
the opinion of the court, holding: (a) that a grand jury witness has standing under
§ 2518(10) (a) ; (b) that, in any case, § 2515 erects a broad prohibition against
the introduction of this kind of evidence, and, accordingly, a court may not compel
introduction of such evidence; and (c) that the fourth amendment prohibited forcing
Sister Egan to testify in that case. Judges Seitz and Van Dusen only concurred in
part (b) and judge Rosenn's concurring opinion, which essentially follows part (b).
A majority thus appears to have agreed only on the second point. Judge Gibbons
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges Aldisert and Forman joined.
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(10) (a) to make a motion to suppress,32 they did agree that if the
questioning was the product of illegal eavesdropping directed at her,
the district court was prohibited from forcing her to testify because
this would be compelling a violation of section 2515's flat rule. The
dissenters insisted that Congress did not intend that section 2515 have
any application independent of section 2518(10) (a)."
The same issues were soon presented to another circuit when
Carol Evans refused, notwithstanding a grant of immunity, to answer
questions, concerning her possible activities with various political
groups, put to her before a federal grand jury sitting in Washington,
D.C. Like Sister Egan, Miss Evans alleged that her subpoena and
questioning were the fruits of unauthorized eavesdropping directed at
her and insisted on a right to remain silent. Held in contempt, she
appealed; the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed on the basis of title III although, as in Egan, the majority
could not agree upon which section to rely.34 Chief Judge Bazelon
doubted that section 2515 could apply independently of section 2518
(10) (a), but insisted that section 2518(10) (a) allowed suppression
motions by grand jury witnesses25  Judge Wright, on the other hand,
relied solely on section 2515.6 Judge Wilkey dissented, complaining
that the majority's misconstruction of title III threatened to bring
grand jury proceedings and the whole criminal justice system to a
grinding halt."
II. STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT
QUESTIONING: TITLE III OF THE SAFE STREETS ACT AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Title III
The overriding purpose of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 was to do something about crime. Debated by the
House and Senate during an election year amid obvious signs that law
and order had become one of the public's principal concerns, the Act
received overwhelming legislative approval the day after Senator Robert
F. Kennedy was shot.3 8 The Safe Streets Act deliberately overruled
32Judges Adams and Hastie found that Egan did have standing pursuant to
§ 2518(10) (a) to make a motion to suppress. Judges Seitz and Van Dusen joined
in the concurring opinion of judge Rosenn which expressed doubts that § 2518(10) (a)
gave standing to grand jury witnesses. See note 31 supra.
33 In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 221 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
34 In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nor. United
States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
35 Id. at 1243.
361d. at 1252 (Wright, J., concurring).
371d. at 1255 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
38 See Harris, Annals of Legislation-The Turning Point, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14,
1968, at 68.
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several Supreme Court decisions which Congress felt had gone too far
in hampering the ability of the criminal justice system to convict crimi-
nals."9 Additionally, for the first time in history, title III gave federal
statutory authorization for wiretapping and bugging by the police to
gather evidence."
Although title III of the Safe Streets Act authorizes court-
approved electronic eavesdropping, it contains several safeguards. The
judge who, on application, authorizes or denies an interception must
cause to be served, on the persons named in the application, notice that
the application was entered, whether any interception was or was not
authorized, and whether any wire or oral communications were in fact
intercepted.4 The notice must be served within ninety days of the
termination of an authorization or its denial, unless on an ex parte
showing of good cause the judge determines that delay is reasonable
or justified. 2 Ten days before the government seeks to use any eaves-
drop evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding, it must notify
all the parties to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding."
For eavesdropping not in accordance with the procedural rules of
the Act and for divulgence or use of the communications overheard, the
statute provides both punishment for the offender and specific remedies
for the victims. Unauthorized eavesdropping and divulgence or use
of the overheard communications are federal crimes punishable by fine
and imprisonment,44 and the victims of the surveillance may recover
civil damages. 5 In addition, section 2515 erects a broad exclusionary
rule,4" while section 2518 (10) (a) permits "aggrieved persons" to make
motions to suppress ". .. the contents of any intercepted wire or oral
communications, or evidence derived therefrom . " in any "trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, . . . or other authority
of the United States . . . . " 47
Sections 2518(10) (a) and 2515 were clearly designed to effectu-
ate one of the stated purposes of title III: ". .. to protect the integrity
of court and administrative proceedings." 4 In addition, the legislative
history suggests a second purpose for these sections: "The perpetrator
[of unauthorized eavesdropping] must be denied the fruits of his un-
39 Title II of the Safe Streets Act was designed to modify the following: United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). See 18 U.S.C. §§3501-02 (1970).
40 Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1970).
4' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d) (1970).
42 Id.
4
3 Id. §2518(9).
441d. §2511.
451d. § 2520.
46 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
47 18 U.S.C. §2518(10) (a) (1970).
48 Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211.
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lawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings." " Whether the sec-
tions may be invoked by witnesses before grand juries the Act does
not make clear.
1. Section 2518(10) (a)
The problem of statutory construction implicit in title III is de-
ceptively simple. Section 2515 on its face erects a broad exclusionary
rule which prohibits the introduction before a broad range of bodies-
including grand juries and legislative committees-of any part of the
contents of, or evidence derived from, an unauthorized interception of
any communication. ° Section 2518(10) (a), on the other hand, in
permitting "aggrieved persons" to make suppression motions, omits
grand juries and legislative committees from its list of bodies before
which such motions may be made.51 Naturally, the inference arises
that Congress intended to omit reference to these bodies.
Of course, as Judge Adams insisted in Egan, a federal grand jury
proceeds under the authority of the United States, and thus the section's
phrase "or other authority of the United States" may include grand
juries and legislative committees. 2 Although consistent with the pur-
49 S. RE'. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968).
50 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
51 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
52450 F.2d at 203. Judge Bazelon agreed with this reasoning. See it re Evans,
452 F2d 1239, 1244-45 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nor. United States v.
Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
Judge Adams further argued that any significance assigned to § 2518 (10) (a)'s
omission was nullified by the enactment of § 702 of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970), which deals with suppression motions and includes
grand juries:
In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained
by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall affirm
or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act;
(3) no claim shall be considered that evidence of an event is inadmissible
on the ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation of an
unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if such event occurred more than
five years after such allegedly unlawful act.
This contention was squarely rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Reynolds, 449 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1971). That court concluded that the purpose of
§ 702 was "not to afford new remedies, but to dispose of the problem of wiretapped
evidence obtained before the enactment of [the Safe Streets Act of 1968]." Id. at
1350.
It is difficult to explain the inconsistency between §2518(10) (a) and §702 of
the 1970 Act. As Judge Rosenn pointed out in Evans, the legislative history of the
1970 Act contains no indication of any intent to alter the scope of § 2518(10) (a).
See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-52 (1970). Section 702 is not
concerned with when claims shall be made that evidence is inadmissible, but how
they shall be litigated when they are made.
Another section of the 1970 Act may explain the apparent inconsistency. Title I
established a new grand jury proceeding, adversary in nature because certain indi-
viduals would be allowed to appear and present witnesses. These grand juries may
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poses of title III, this construction, which would permit suppression
motions by an aggrieved grand jury witness, is questionable in light of
section 2515, where "grand jury" was specifically listed rather than
left under the catchall phrase, and the legislative history of section 2518.
Explaining section 2518(10) (a), the senate report pointedly
dwells on the nature of grand jury proceedings and federal court juris-
diction over Congress itself, clearly suggesting that the omission of
any specific reference to these bodies should not be disregarded." The
relevant part of the report reads:
[Paragraph 10 (a)] provides the remedy for the right created
by section 2515. Because no person is a party as such to a
grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the
making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a pro-
ceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation on the char-
acter of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which
is enforcible by an individual. (Blue v. United States, 384
U.S. 251 (1965)). There is no intent to change this general
rule. It is the intent of the provision only that when a motion
to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may in-
clude use in a future grand jury proceeding. Nor is there any
intent to grant jurisdiction to Federal courts over the Con-
gress itself.5"
report to the federal district court which impaneled them concerning noncriminal
misconduct of appointed public employees and may recommend discipline or removal.
18 U.S.C. § 3333 (a) (a) (1970). The district court has power to file a report as a
public record if it is supported by a "preponderance of the evidence," id. § 3333 (b) (1),
and each person named in the report has been afforded an opportunity to appear
before the grand jury and call "any reasonable number of witnesses in his behalf."
Id. §3333(b) (2).
Thus, Congress may have listed grand jury in § 702 because it had just created
a class of parties as such to grand jury proceedings. Under this analysis, § 702
is consistent with the provisions contained in the Safe Streets Act, and reinforces
rather than overcomes a general conclusion that the purpose of Congress has been to
make available the suppression remedy only to litigants in adversary hearings.
Congress may not, however, have intended to make the remedy available even in
the context of the new type of grand jury proceeding. Although modeled after a
similar New York statute, which allows a court to accept a report only if it is
supported by "the preponderance of the credible and legally admissible evidence"
(emphasis added), title I of the 1970 Act requires the report be supported by the
preponderance of the evidence. Compare N.Y. CODE CaILr. Paoc. § 190.85(2) (a)
(McKinney 1971), with Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 924 (1970). This difference is
not explained by the legislative history, but its mere existence suggests that Congress
intended to withhold from persons before the special grand jury the suppression
remedy. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1970). But see
Letter from Dep't of Justice to Hon. Emanuel Celler, July 23, 1970, reprinted in
id. 77-78. Thus it appears unlikely that Congress intended through the same legisla-
tion to extend the suppression remedy to witnesses before an ordinary grand jury
where a prior determination had not been made that a title III violation had occurred.
53 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
54 Id. at 106. There is little other legislative history concerning the issues raised
in Egan and Evans. The debates in the House and Senate on title III at no time
focused on the intended scope of the statutory exclusionary rule or the availability
of the suppression remedy. See 114 CoN. REc. 14,469-86, 14,693-705, 14,706-51,
16,271-300 (1968).
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In many ways the senate report's reference to Blue is ambiguous
and misleading. That case involved only the question whether dismissal
of an indictment is proper when the defendant has been compelled to be
a witness against himself while testifying before the grand jury.5 5 In
Blue, having found no violation of the defendant's fifth amendment
privilege, the Court went on to suggest in dictum that if a violation had
occurred, Blue's only remedy would be suppression of the evidence
at trial:
Even if we assume that the Government did acquire in-
criminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and
its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial.
While the general common-law practice is to admit evidence
despite its illegal origins, this Court in a number of areas has
recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence
has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the
Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.
Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of
such illegally obtained evidence assumes implicitly that the
remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether.
So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends
served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an
intolerable degree interference with the public interest in hav-
ing the guilty brought to book.56
Neither this suggestion nor the holding of Blue indicates that the
defendant is entitled to protection by the exclusionary rule only at the
trial, since Blue involved not the exclusionary rule but the defendant's
ability to get an indictment dismissed. That different policies are in-
volved in the two situations is revealed by the general reluctance of
courts to dismiss indictments as compared to the general rule that a
targeted defendant may move to suppress illegally obtained evidence
prior to indictment.5" Thus, it is simply not true, as the senate report
asserts, that "there is no limitation on the character of evidence that
may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforcible by an individual."
Notwithstanding the problems and ambiguities presented by the
citation to Blue, the senate report does suggest that grand juries were
55 United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); see In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199,
205 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971) ;
In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1245 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nor. United
States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
56 United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (footnote omitted).
57 Compare e.g., id., with, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (19205; In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Fried
v. United States, 331 U.S. 858, cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804, cert. dismissed on motion
of counsel for petitioner, 332 U.S. 807 (1947).
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purposely excluded from the reach of section 2518(10) (a), that "other
authority of the United States" should not be construed to include
grand juries,5" and that regardless of the facts and holding of Blue, this
is what Congress intended. In light of the senate report, the intent of
the provision appears to be that aggrieved persons must wait until they
find themselves parties " to a proceeding before a court, department,
officer, agency, or regulatory body, before seeking to suppress whatever
"tainted" evidence the government or other perpetrator of a title III
crime seeks to introduce.6" Then, if they are successful, the scope of
58 Cf. 18 U.S.C. §2518(9) (1970), which provides:
The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence
derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in
any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State Court unless
each party, not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has
been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application,
under which the interception was authorized or approved ...
Explaining this section the senate report states: "'Proceeding' is intended to include
all adversary type hearings . . . . It would not include a grand jury hearing."
S. RF,. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1968).
59 The senate report indicates that grand jury was omitted from § 2518(10) (a)
not because of any special purpose not to interfere with grand jury proceedings but
because of Congress' view that: "no person is a party as such to grand jury pro-
ceedings." In other words, Congress envisioned that §2518(10)(a) suppression
motions would be made only by parties.
60 The bill which ultimately became title III, S. 675, allowed suppression motions
only by defendants in criminal trials. Section 8(g) of the bill provided:
Any defendant in a criminal trial in a Federal court may move in that court
to suppress the use as evidence of the contents of any intercepted communica-
tion or any part thereof or evidence derived therefrom. . . . If the motion
is granted the evidence shall not be admissible in any court or proceeding.
113 Cong. Rec. 1593 (1967).
Although §8(g) was substantially redrafted to incorporate the aggrieved person
limitation and make available the suppression remedy in civil as well as criminal
proceedings, Senate Report 1097 supports a conclusion that there was no intent to
extend the suppression remedy to non-litigants.
By requiring the victim of an illegal search and seizure to wait until he finds
himself a party to a proceeding before a court, etc., §2518(10) (a) may conflict with
rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the
property and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained . . .
If the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise
subject to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any
hearing or trial.
Rule 41(e) contains no standing requirement that the person must already be in a
proceeding before he seeks to make a suppression motion and has been construed to
allow such motions before indictment whether or not a return of tangible property
is obtainable. It Re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nomn. Fried v.
United States, 331 U.S. 858, cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804, cert. dismissed on mnotion of
counsel for petitioner, 332 U.S. 807 (1947) ; see also, Centracchio v. Garrity, 195 F.2d
382, 387 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952).
Rule 41(e) cannot help Egan and Evans, however, unless it is construed to
allow the victim of an illegal search to prevent government use of the fruits for
purposes other than to incriminate him. Such a construction is not precluded by the
words of the rule, but there is evidence of an underlying presumption that besides
persons seeking the return of their property, the rule would only be invoked by
targeted or indicted defendants to prevent use of evidence to indict or convict them.
The final paragraph states: "The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless
. . . the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion . . . ." (emphasis
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the suppression order may include use in a future grand jury pro-
ceeding.6
2. Section 2515
Of nine judges who considered the issue in Egan and Evans,62
only three thought that section 2518(10) (a) allows motions to sup-
press by grand jury witnesses. But, as seven judges concluded, 3 this
does not necessarily mean that the court can compel the witness to
answer questions derived from information obtained by an unauthorized
interception of his communications. Such compulsion by a court exer-
cising its contempt power may be barred by the unequivocal prohibition
of section 2515, which in such cases may operate independently of
section 2518(10) (a). 64
The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended the
two sections to be read and construed together, with section 2518
(10) (a) limiting the effect of section 2515. Senate Report 1097 states:
[Section 2515] must, of course, be read in light of section
2518(10) (a) . . . which defines the class entitled to make a
motion to suppress35
[Section 2518(10) (a)] must be read in connection with
section 2515 . . . which it limits.66
Apart from the legislative history, however, section 2515 on its
face erects a broad exclusionary rule and indicates neither the remedy
for the right it creates nor the parties in whose favor the right may be
added). Moreover, the rule was designed to restate existing law as developed by
the Supreme Court. 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 141.02, at 41-6 (2d ed. 1970).
The Court had only prevented the use of illegally seized evidence to incriminate the
victim. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
61 The permissible scope of the suppression order can explain the difference
between § 2518(10) (a) (omitting grand jury) and § 2515 (including grand jury).
62 In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., delivering the judgment of
the court in an opinion in which Hastie, C.J., concurred), cert. granted sub nont.
United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971) ; It re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bazelon, J.), petition for cert. filed sub norn. United States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W.
3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
63 Judges Adams and Hastie accepted this viewpoint on the assumption that
§2518 (10) (a) does not confer standing. In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 209 (3d Cir.),
cert. granted sub norn. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971). Judges Rosenn,
Seitz, and Van Dusen, who disagreed with judge Adams on the scope of standing
under § 2518(10) (a), decided solely on this ground. Id. at 217. In Evans, Judge
Wright concurred solely on this ground; Judge Bazelon suggested that he might
accept this rationale, but did not reach it because he agreed with Judge Adams on
the standing issue under § 2518(10) (a). In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1245 (D.C.
Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub norn. United States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091
(U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
64 See In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 217 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring), cert.
granted sub norn. United States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
65 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1968).
66 Id. 106.
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invoked. As Judge Bazelon has suggested, 7 however, if section 2515
is viewed as being independent of section 2518(10) (a), it is difficult
to stop short of allowing any person whose communications have been
intercepted "to intervene in any proceeding where he believes that evi-
dence from the interception is being used, even if he would not other-
wise be a participant in any capacity in that proceeding." " Thus,
unless section 2518(10) (a) is construed to limit the application of
section 2515, and unless the two sections are considered together in
accordance with the "conventional maxim that a statute should be con-
sidered as a whole," the result will entail obvious shortcomings."'
It is possible, however, to agree that sections 2515 and 2518
(10) (a) should be read and construed together without conceding
that section 2515 can never have independent operation and significance.
Thus, Congress may have intended section 2518(10) (a), permitting
suppression motions, to apply as a limit on section 2515 only in cases
where suppression motions are appropriately called for; in those cases
in which suppression motions are inappropriate, section 2515 may have
independent operation. Suppose, for example,70 that a prosecutor seeks
to introduce the tapes of an illegally intercepted conversation into evi-
dence before a grand jury or to call as a witness the agent who over-
heard or recorded the conversation. If a party to the overheard con-
versation wants to prevent the prosecutor from proceeding along his
intended course, he will need an affirmative court order, since he wants
the court to aid him in preventing a particular action. Thus, a sup-
pression order would be an appropriate remedy. Section 2518(10) (a),
which regulates the making of motions to suppress, would apply and
may operate to prevent a section 2515 claim from being raised. "That
is not this case [Egan], however," Judge Rosenn insisted. "I think it
is quite a different matter when, as here, the prosecutor attempts to
elicit the testimony of an aggrieved person himself.'" 7
Although Judge Rosenn did not explain in detail the distinction
between offering into evidence illegally obtained tapes and questioning
a party to the conversation, who, but for the illegal wiretap, would not
have been called and questioned, several reasons suggest that the dis-
tinction may support the view that section 2518(10) (a) was not in-
tended to limit section 2515 in all cases. First, to a witness about to
be questioned on the basis of an illegal wiretap, a motion to suppress
would be neither necessary nor appropriate. In his defensive posture
he does not need the court's affirmative aid-relief that requires the
court to do something for him. Instead, he wants to stand mute while
OT ln re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1244 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub norn.
United States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 219 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. United
States v. Egan, 404 U.S. 990 (1971).
71 Id.
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trusting that the court itself will not take affirmative action in support
of the government to require testimony which in his view would violate
the statute and the Constitution. In other words, at most he is asking
the court to withhold the aid of its coercive power from the government.
The distinction between these two postures is relevant because it
suggests that Congress may not have intended, by enacting section
2518 (10) (a), to foreclose a remedy to one in a defensive situation.
It probably did not think about this situation at all. If Congress had
contemplated providing a remedy for the witness in a defensive posture,
the section 2518(10) (a) mechanism would have been a poor choice;
a more appropriate remedy would be section 2515 alone which, on its
face at least, appears self-executing, requires the making of no motion,
and can be interpreted to prohibit the court from aiding the government
in forcing testimony of this kind.
Thus, the nature of the section 2518(10) (a) limitation may deter-
mine its own applicability. All that can be attributed to Congress is
the intention to provide an affirmative remedy-a suppression order-
to those who fall within section 2518(10) (a); motions to suppress,
however, could not be made in the context of a grand jury proceeding.
In addition, the nature of the court's role in the two situations
supports this distinction and suggests that section 2518(10) (a) was
not necessarily meant to limit section 2515 in all cases. It is one thing
for a court to refuse to grant a suppression motion and, thus, to take
action to prevent a possible violation of section 2515 and of section
2511 (1), which prohibits the disclosure or use of the contents of il-
legally intercepted communications. It is quite another thing for the
court itself to compel a section 2515 violation or to aid in the com-
mission of a section 2511(1) crime. This latter course of action is
clearly more offensive to the notions of judicial integrity which Con-
gress had in mind when it passed title III. Concurring in Evans, where
he rested solely on section 2515, Judge Wright concluded:
To exact by court order testimony which is the fruit of wire-
tapping crimes from a witness before the grand jury is not
only to involve the courts and the witness, as well as the
executive department, in the commission and exploitation of
crimes, but it is to do so in defiance of the explicit command
of the statute. And for a court, on petition of the executive
department, to sentence a witness, who is herself the victim
of the illegal wiretapping, to jail for refusal to participate in
the exploitation of that crime in violation of the explicit com-
mand of Section 2515 is to stand our whole system of crimi-
nal justice on its head. 2
72 I, re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1252 (D.C. Cir.), pettion for cert. filed sub nor.
United States v. Evans, 40 U.S.L.W. 3091 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1971) (No. 71-256)
(footnote omitted).
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Notwithstanding its appeal in theory, construing title III to au-
thorize witnesses, who cannot make suppression motions, to refuse to
answer questions allegedly the fruit of unauthorized surveillance, reads
a great deal into congressional silence and presents some obvious prac-
tical difficulties. It is at least unlikely that the same Congress which
apparently did not intend to give the suppression motion to nonliti-
gants " did intend to create a new witness privilege with hardly less
disruptive effects.74
In many instances the availability to witnesses of a section 2515
claim may sidetrack the grand jury from its main business and cause
delay.75 When the source of its questions is challenged, the govern-
ment may be able to assure the court that the witness's communications
were never intercepted.76 Labor and time may, however, still be in-
volved before the government can make such an assurance, because it
may have to search the voluminous files of any number of different
agencies, depending upon whether it can show that-even assuming
there was a tap-the evidence was derived from an independent source.
In cases where the government admits that electronic surveillance was
directed against the witness, with or without court order, a hearing
will be necessary to determine whether the procedures designated in
title III were properly followed and, if not, whether the government's
questioning, again, derives from a sufficiently "independent source." 77
Cases may also arise in which the government may be unable to assert
or establish the absence of wiretapping, yet there may be no evidence
that there was a tap. Moreover, the delays may extend beyond the
hearing itself, because any judgment of contempt against a witness who
continues to remain silent, even after the government has established
73 See note 59 supra & accompanying text.
74 The disruptive effects of recognizing a new witness privilege would be at
least somewhat less than allowing suppression motions by persons who are neither
parties, witnesses or even welcome in particular proceedings. Where only the witness
privilege is recognized, the government can anticipate and prepare in advance for the
raising of the exclusionary rule claim.
75 Delay is a critical consideration particularly in criminal proceedings. In
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940), the Supreme Court observed:
"[t]o be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden footed .. [E]ncour-
agement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law." Id. at 325. Of
course, to call any time involved in determining the witness's claim "delay" begs the
question. Indeed, once it has been determined that the exclusionary rule does apply
to grand jury proceedings, time spent in determining the factual issues simply cannot
be called delay. See It re Callandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
in which Chief Judge Battisti pointed out that "[tihe term delay means that time
during which a case is allowed to be unresolved when there is no justifiable reason
not to dispose of the lawsuit. Delay means unavoidable delay. Id. at 741.
76 See, e.g., In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971).
77 Section 2515 excludes evidence "derived" from title III violations. Presumably,
the concept of "independent source" first expounded by the Supreme Court in Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), will apply in hearings
on §2515 claims.
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the absence of wiretapping or after a hearing has been held denying
his claim, will be appealable."
The result in Egan and Evans also has implications for the ability
of grand juries to carry on effectively their business of investigating
criminal activity.7" If successful, section 2515 claims will frustrate the
grand jury's investigatory function by depriving it of valuable, reliable
evidence. More importantly, even the raising of a section 2515 claim
will endanger the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, if it requires a
judicially supervised adversary hearing where the government may be
forced to show independent source or probable cause by relying on the
statements of earlier witnesses. Secrecy has been deemed essential to
the proper and effective exercise of the grand jury's investigatory func-
tion for several reasons. While it encourages witnesses to testify freely
without fear of reprisal, secrecy also conceals the subject of investiga-
tion so that prospective defendants will not be induced to flee the juris-
diction. Furthermore, secrecy minimizes the chances of perjury or
subornation by subsequent witnesses, and prevents the disclosure of
investigations and possible prejudice in the event an indictment is not
returned."0 The policy of secrecy, as well as historical reasons, explains
why grand juries heretofore have been subjected to so few objective
constraints concerning the kind of evidence they may receive.8"
The above analysis suggests no definitive answer to the problem
of statutory construction involved in Egan and Evans. In terms of
attributing to Congress a rational intention, either of two conflicting
constructions is possible. Thus, the defensive posture of grand jury
witnesses, notions of judicial integrity, and the nature and degree of
judicial interference in such cases support the Egan and Evans results
without obviously vitiating Congress' intent. On the other hand, the
statute can be rationally construed to mean that only those who fall
within the terms of section 2518(10) (a) have the benefit of the statu-
tory prohibition contained in section 2515. Such a construction means,
in effect, that section 2518(10) (a) provides the only means to prevent
violations of section 2515. This construction attributes to Congress
an intention not to protect grand jury witnesses at all by means of the
exclusionary rule.
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). This appeal cannot take more than a period of
30 days, and during that time the witness may be admitted to bail unless it appears
that the "appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." Id. § 1826(b).
79
The grand jury serves two great functions. One is to bring to trial
persons accused of crime upon just grounds. The other is to protect persons
against unfounded or malicious prosecutions by insuring that no criminal
proceeding will be undertaken without a disinterested determination of prob-
able guilt. The inquisitorial function has been called the more important.
Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394 (1959).
80 Id. 403.
81 See Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Iury, Pro-
ceedings, 72 YALE LJ. 590, 596 (1963).
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The statutory construction problem cannot be resolved satisfac-
torily, and probably stems from a failure by Congress to anticipate the
Egan and Evans situation. In fact, prior to the enactment of title III
witnesses simply had not been raising exclusionary rule claims. Per-
haps Congress attempted to embody existing law 82 without recognizing
that the immunity provision contained in title III added a significant
factor which would influence future situations. In any event, while
staying within the plain words of section 2515 on the theory that the
section can at least in limited circumstances have independent operation,
the majorities in Egan and Evans probably reached a result which
Congress, in the atmosphere which prevailed during the passage of
title III, would have disapproved. The question remains whether, re-
gardless of Congress' action and probable intention, the Egan and
Evans result is supported or required by the fourth amendment.
B. Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Although the exclusionary rule was developed principally to pro-
tect the integrity and vitality of the fourth amendment, its use by the
courts has revealed exceptions which are difficult to reconcile with the
rule's purpose."8 As administered by the Supreme Court, the judicially
created exclusionary rule together with its exceptions has produced
incongruous results.
In the recent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire," for example,
the Court reversed a conviction because the prosecution had used evi-
dence obtained under a search warrant issued by the Attorney General
of New Hampshire acting as a justice of the peace. Although the pro-
cedure was unquestionably valid under existing state law, the Court
found that the procedure failed to satisfy the requirements of the fourth
amendment, applicable to the states under the fourteenth, because the
warrant had not been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.
In an earlier decision, Wong Sun v. United States,85 the Court
held that evidence was admissible against a defendant although it had
been obtained during the arrest of another without warrant or reason-
able suspicion. Acting on vague information given by a possessor of
narcotics who had never before told them anything, federal agents broke
into "Blackie" Toy's home at six in the morning and placed him under
arrest. Toy refused to admit that he had been selling narcotics, but
gave information which eventually led to the seizure of narcotics from
Johnny Yee and the arrest of Wong Sun. The Court held that the
82 Concerning the § 2510(11) definition of "aggrieved person," which limited the
class of people who would have standing to invoke § 2518(10) (a), Senate Report
1097 explained: "It is intended to reflect existing law." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 91 (1968).
83 See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREmE CouRT 76 (1966).
84403 U.S. 443 (1971).
85371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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evidence could be used against Wong Sun, who was not the victim of
the illegal police conduct; against Toy, the victim of the illegal arrest,
the evidence was excluded.
In Coolidge, the investigators attempted to obey the existing law
as they understood it; in Wong Sun, the federal investigators either
were inexcusably ignorant of existing law or simply disregarded it.
The Court applied the exclusionary rule vigorously in Coolidge but
allowed an exception in Wong Sun. The source of the Wong Sun
result is, of course, the standing requirement. No one can object to
government use of illegally seized evidence unless his property interests
or, since Katz v. United States,"0 his privacy, was invaded by the search.
The standing requirement was developed by the lower federal
courts in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United
States.8 7 In Connolly v. Medalie,8 a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York
for an order suppressing evidence which had been obtained in an un-
lawful search of the brewery where he had been employed as a watch-
man. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's grant of the suppression motion on the ground that the
defendant had no possessory interest in the premises and thus lacked
standing. Judge Learned Hand explained that the power to suppress
was remedial and was unavailable to one who had not been wronged:
The power to suppress the use of evidence unlawfully ob-
tained is a corollary of the power to regain it. The prosecu-
tion is forbidden to profit by a wrong whose remedies are
inadequate for the injury, unless they include protection
against any use of the property seized as a means to convic-
tion. The relief being thus remedial, the evidence has never
been thought incompetent against anyone but the victim.
Conceivably it might have been; it might have been held that
the prosecution, though not disqualified from taking advan-
tage of another's wrong, should not profit in any way by its
own. But that would obviously introduce other than remedial
considerations .... 89
The Supreme Court approved the property interest requirement
without ever agreeing that the nature of the exclusionary rule is reme-
86 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52.
87 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
88 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
891d. at 630.
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dial. The point was first presented in Goldstein v. United States,90 a
case arising under section 605 of the 1934 Federal Communications
Act." The petitioner sought reversal of his criminal conviction be-
cause the trial court had admitted testimony obtained by illegal inter-
ception of a witness's telephone conversations. Noting that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule had never been applied in favor of one
whose own fourth amendment rights had not been violated, the Court
merely considered whether the rule should be extended, at least in cases
involving violations of section 605 of the Communications Act. "We
think," the Court concluded, "no broader sanction should be imposed
on the Government .... ," 92
After an attempt in Jones v. United States 93 to explain the stand-
ing requirement in terms of legal principle,9 the Court in Alderman v.
United States 9 5 upheld the continuing validity of the standing require-
ment and returned to the argument that public policy weighed against
any extension of the exclusionary rule:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those
whose rights the police have violated have been considered
sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even
though the case against the defendant is weakened or de-
stroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not con-
vinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusion-
ary rule to other defendants would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on
the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.96
The usual exclusionary rule standing problem is, however, quite
different from the issue raised in the Egan and Evans cases. In the
typical case a standing problem is raised, as in Alderman, because the
defendant wishes to raise an exclusionary rule claim by asserting that
someone else's fourth amendment rights have been violated and that
evidence derived from that violation is being used against him. Al-
90 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
9147 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
92 316 U.S. at 121.
93 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
94
[A] party will not be heard to claim a constitutional protection unless
he "belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is
given .. " New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907).
The restrictions upon searches and seizures were obviously designed for pro-
tection against official invasions of privacy and the security of property.
They are not exclusionary provisions against the kinds of evidence deemed
inherently unreliable or prejudicial. The exclusion in federal trials of evidence
otherwise competent but gathered by federal officials in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is a means for making effective the protection of privacy.
362 U.S. at 261.
95 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (only victims of 4th amendment violations have standing).
96 Id. at 174, 175.
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though the other person, whose rights were violated, could raise the
exclusionary rule claim if he were a defendant, the courts hold that the
defendant whose rights were not violated lacks standing to raise the
exclusionary claim. Yet the case in which a defendant asserts that his
rights have been violated, and in which he would have standing, is
factually indistinguishable from Egan and Evans in terms of the person
claiming the benefit of the exclusionary rule. In both cases the person
claiming the protection of the exclusionary rule is the person whose
fourth amendment rights were allegedly violated. Thus, no issue of
the vicarious assertion of the constitutional rights of others, the issue
which is at the heart of the typical standing problem, arises. The only
difference between the two cases is that one person is a defendant, and
the other, a grand jury witness. The important questions raised by
Egan and Evans, then, are whether the exclusionary rule applies in a
grand jury proceeding and in whose favor it applies.
There is no question that the exclusionary rule applies to grand
jury proceedings. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States "' the
Supreme Court held that a district court could not hold in contempt
those who refused to produce books and documents before a grand jury
considering indictments against them,9" when government knowledge
of the books and documents had been obtained by violating their fourth
amendment rights. In Silverthorne, after Frederick Silverthorne and
his father had been indicted, government authorities without warrant
searched the Silverthorne Lumber Company, seizing all the company's
books, papers, and documents. Later, upon application, the materials
were returned, although not before they had been photographed or
copied. After the return, the company and Frederick Silverthorne
were ordered by the federal district court to produce the same materials
before a grand jury now considering a new indictment based on the
knowledge obtained from the previously obtained materials. Refusing
to comply with the orders, the company was fined and Frederick Silver-
thorne was imprisoned. The Supreme Court reversed both contempt
convictions on fourth amendment grounds:
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly.
It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which
the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before
it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge
that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular
form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution
97251 U.S. 385 (1920).
98 The reported Supreme Court decision does not specifically state that the grand
jury was considering indictments against those refusing to obey the subpoenas duces
tecum. Frederick Silverthorne and the Silverthorne Lumber Company were subse-
quently indicted. See United States v. Silverthorne, 265 F. 853 (1920); United
States v. Silverthorne, 265 F. 859 (1920). For contemporaneous student comments
on Silverthorne, see 33 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1920); 29 YALE L.J. 553 (1920);
20 COLuIm. L. REv. 484 (1920).
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covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the
Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing
the forbidden act. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly
before the grand jury was unwarranted, but it is taken to
mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our
opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amend-
ment to a form of words.
99
Although Silverthorne clearly established the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, the Court's principal con-
cern was probably preventing the government from using illegally
seized evidence to incriminate or convict the victim of the fourth amend-
ment violation. The Court squarely rested its result on Weeks v.
United States 100 which held that the government could not retain for
introduction at trial, papers and letters illegally seized from a defendant.
Moreover, except for the words of Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, that "[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all," 101
nothing in Silverthorne indicates a broader concern than with the spe-
cific facts of the case: the government was seeking to use illegally seized
evidence to fine or imprison the victims.
This analysis suggests that the Silverthorne Court was concerned
more with the effect on the search and seizure victim from admission of
the illegally obtained evidence (the possibility that such evidence could
lead to his indictment or conviction) than with the effect on the victim
from his refusal to obey the subpoena (citation for contempt). Only
the latter effect was, of course, present in Egan and Evans-in fact,
99 251 U.S. at 391-92.
100 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Focusing on the precise question it was deciding, the
Court in Weeks stated:
The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the right of
the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the
letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence
and without his authority, by a United States Marshal holding no warrant
for his arrest and none for the search of his premises.
Id. at 393. The Court concluded that a federal court had no such right because:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are con-
cerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id.
101 251 U.S. at 392. Although Justice Holmes' quotation can be read out of
context to mean that illegally seized evidence cannot be used against anyone, it is
clear from his opinion that he meant only that illegally seized evidence may not be
used by the government to obtain other evidence. Noting that Weeks would prevent
the government from introducing the illegally obtained evidence before the grand
jury, Justice Holmes said that "[i]t reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words" if Weeks "is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of
one." Id.
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both witnesses received jail sentences for refusing to testify. Because
of the grant of immunity, however, in neither Egan nor Evans was the
witness faced with the possibility that introduction of the illegally ob-
tained evidence could lead to her indictment or conviction. Silverthorne
does not speak directly to such a situation since, on its facts at least, it
only prohibits a court from citing for contempt a victim who refuses
to comply with a subpoena or an order to testify, when the exclusionary
rule makes a refusal to comply proper. And Silverthorne does not sug-
gest that the exclusionary rule applies when the victim does not face
the possibility of indictment or conviction resulting from the use of the
seized evidence.
No court has squarely held that the victim of an illegal search and
seizure may raise an exclusionary rule claim where the government
intends to use the illegally obtained evidence for purposes other than
to incriminate, indict, or convict him." 2 This is the precise issue pre-
sented in Egan and Evans: whether a mere witness in a grand jury
proceeding may raise an exclusionary rule claim for which she would
have the requisite standing if she were a defendant at trial or a targeted
defendant in a grand jury proceeding.
The only difference, with respect to this issue, between a targeted
defendant and a mere witness, both called to testify before a grand jury,
is that in addition to any harm such questioning may cause the mere
witness, the targeted defendant might also be indicted. Whether this
102 The question whether and to what extent the exclusionary rule applies when
the government attempts to use the illegally obtained evidence for purposes other
than to incriminate the victim is still not settled. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), the Court held that the rule does apply in for-
feiture proceedings because such proceedings, though civil in form, are criminal in
nature. The same reasoning was earlier employed by the Court with respect to
federal forfeiture proceedings when the question involved was whether the fourth
amendment itself applied. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, however, it is evident that the Court was thinking about
criminal proceedings and, therefore, the case is of little value in determining the
applicability of the exclusionary rule in a non-criminal context. The Court concluded:
"[i]t would be anomalous indeed . . . to hold that in the criminal proceeding the
illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the
determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be
admissible." 380 U.S. at 701.
Although the Supreme Court has so far applied the exclusionary rule only in
cases in which the government seeks to gain testimony from the victim of a fourth
amendment violation to send him to jail or deprive him of property, nevertheless,
compelled testimony for use against a third party, as in Egan and Evans, does infringe
upon a person's privacy and may itself be considered a search and seizure. See
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-2 (1886) ; Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa.
203, 213, 2 A.2d 612, 617-18 (1938). In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969), the Court concluded: "there is a substantial difference for constitutional
purposes between preventing the incrimination of a defendant through the very evi-
dence illegally seized from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party
who cannot claim this predicate for exclusion." Id. at 174.
The real question raised by Egan and Evans is whether there is a substantial
difference for constitutional purposes between the use of illegally seized evidence to
incriminate the victim and use of the evidence to secure a new breach of his privacy
or merely to force him to do something he does not want to do. In other words the
question presented by both cases is whether and to what extent may a victim who
is not a defendant invoke the benefit of the exclusionary rule.
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distinction is relevant for the purpose of applying the exclusionary rule
depends upon the purpose of that rule and the fourth amendment which
it implements.
Although members of the Supreme Court have at times suggested
various purposes for the exclusionary rule," 3 the Court has recently
ascribed to it, as its only purpose, the deterrence of illegal police con-
duct. In Linkletter v. Walker,'" the petitioner had been convicted in a
Louisiana court on the basis of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure two years before Mapp v. Ohio '05 applied the ex-
clusionary rule to the states. Arguing that the exclusionary rule is a
personal right guaranteeing to him, the victim of illegal police activity,
that he not be convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence, Linkletter brought a habeas corpus petition seeking retroactive
effect for Mapp.0 6 Affirming the denial of the writ, the Court con-
cluded that "the purpose [of the exclusionary rule] was to deter the
lawless action of the police and to effectively enforce the Fourth Amend-
ment. That purpose will not at this late date be served by the whole-
sale release of the guilty victims." 107
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, it would ap-
pear that the distinction between Egan and Evans on the one hand and
Silverthorne on the other is not relevant. The amount of potential
harm to an individual has little to do with whether exclusion in a par-
ticular case will deter future illegal police activity. But the standing
doctrine with its focus on the status of the individual raising the claim
still must be dealt with. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam has noted,
the standing doctrine means more than the principle that constitutional
rights cannot be asserted vicariously. The standing doctrine represents
an unarticulated attempt to mark the point of diminishing returns of
the deterrence principle:
As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of
diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued ap-
plication is a public nuisance. The courts apparently have
recognized this; the foggy doctrine of "standing" . ap-
pear[s] responsive to it.'08
As an attempt to draw the line against too much deterrence, the
standing doctrine is irrational. Because it focuses entirely on the status
103 See notes 2-4 supra & accompanying text. Compare Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
104381 U.S. 618 (1965).
105 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
106 381 U.S. at 621.
107 Id. at 637.
108 Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 378, 389 (1964).
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of the person raising the claim, in many cases the doctrine has precluded
consideration of such questions as the importance of the particular
interest violated, the extent of deviation from lawful conduct, the ex-
tent to which the violation was willful, the extent to which privacy was
invaded, and the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent viola-
tions of the fourth amendment.10 9 Yet these are the considerations
which should be decisive.
Ideally the determination of whether to apply the exclusionary rule
in a particular set of circumstances should be made by balancing the
gain in deterrence against the loss to society's interest in the effective
administration of the criminal justice system. Such an attempt at
balancing clearly underlay the decision of the Supreme Court in Alder-
man."' Of course, in a close case, it may be difficult or impossible to
balance with accuracy the competing gains and losses. But in Egan
and Evans, several considerations suggest that the balance may be
one sided.
First, because of the nature of wiretapping, it is likely that the
alleged fourth amendment violations in Egan and Evans involved more
than inadvertence or action in the heat of the moment."' To the ex-
tent that illegal wiretapping is deliberate, the need for strong judicial
response in removing the incentive for the illegal police conduct is
particularly strong, because official disregard for lawful procedures in
this area poses the most dangerous threat to the privacy protected by
the fourth amendment." 2  Moreover, because the usual standing rule
apparently permits the police to violate one person's fourth amendment
rights in order to obtain evidence to convict someone else,"' refusing
to permit the victim to assert the exclusionary rule claim only encour-
ages the police to continue to employ such illegal practices.
Second, although the application of the exclusionary rule in a par-
ticular case may mean that the government will be unable to secure an
indictment or conviction, the long term effect of applying the exclu-
sionary rule in cases such as Egan and Evans will be that in the future
the police will have to follow the warrant procedures required by the
'
0 9 See ALI MoDEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRocEDuRE § 802(2), at 22
(1971 Tent. Draft No. 4).
.1o See 394 U.S. at 174-75, where the Court stated:
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclu-
sionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted
or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
III
Surreptitious electronic surveillance . . . is a "search and seizure" within
the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. . . . It is usually the product of
calculated, official decision rather than the error of an individual agent of
the state.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 203 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
112 Id.
113 See id. at 174.
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fourth amendment and the procedures set forth in title III.114 Such
burden as is involved must be borne because Congress and the Consti-
tution so require.
Third, courts continue to lack instruments with which to encour-
age compliance with the statutory and constitutional procedural re-
quirements regulating government use of surreptitious electronic sur-
veillance. Although the Safe Streets Act provides civil damages '15
and criminal sanctions 116 for a statutory violation, section 2520 pro-
vides: "A good faith reliance on a court order or legislative authoriza-
tion shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter . . . ." "' Under this provision, if it
develops that interception was in fact conducted, but under court order,
the issue will be whether there was "good faith" reliance on the court
order. Questions such as the existence of probable cause or the par-
ticularity of the court order become irrelevant except insofar as they
have a bearing on the good faith issue. These suits or prosecutions,
therefore, can not be expected to clarify the probable cause or particu-
larity safeguards or create any pressure for stricter obedience to them.
Yet here is precisely where constant clarification and pressure may be
necessary.""
Some of these suits may be predicated on eavesdropping without
court order. The issue would then become whether there was good
faith reliance on legislative authorization, particularly on section
2518(7) which allows eavesdropping without court order for a period
of up to forty-eight hours by an authorized government investigator
who "reasonably" determines that:
(a) an emergency situation exists with respect to conspira-
torial activities threatening the national security interest or
to conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime
that requires a wire or oral communication to be intercepted
before an order authorizing such interception can with due
diligence be obtained, and
(b) there are grounds upon which an order could be
entered under this chapter to authorize such interception
119
114 The requirements in title III may not be constitutionally sufficient. See
Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and
Order", 67 MIcH. L. REv. 455 (1969); Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance-Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RuTGERs L. REV.
319 (1969). But see United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
(Title III fully satisfies demands of 4th amendment and cases thereunder).
31
5 18 U.S.C. §2520 (1970).
116Id. §2511.
117Id. §2520.
118 Many judges simply rubberstamp wiretap applications. See Schwartz, supra
note 114, at 483-84.
119 18 U.S.C. §2518(7) (1970).
[Vol.120:546
SUPPRESSION MOTIONS BY NONDEFENDANTS
This issue of "good faith" reliance is significantly different from
the issue whether the situation was in fact included in the section
2518(7) exception to the warrant requirement. The "good faith"
proviso in section 2520 effectively renders the civil and criminal reme-
dies incapable of securing strict compliance with the lawful procedures
established by the Safe Streets Act, which procedures are the minimum
mandated by the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the notion that any "good faith" test can effectively secure the
protections of the fourth amendment. In Beck v. Ohio 120 the Court
stated :
We may assume that the officers acted in good faith in arrest-
ing the petitioner. But "good faith on the part of arresting
officers is not enough. .... " If subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects" only in the discretion of the
police.12'
Fourth, allowing a witness to raise exclusionary rule claims in
grand jury proceedings often will be time consuming. When the wit-
ness's allegations are sufficient, a hearing on the exclusionary rule claim
will be necessary. Such a hearing and any appeal which follows 
122
will take time. To the extent that the exclusionary rule is at least not
per se inapplicable to victims such as Egan and Evans, however, it
should be recognized that any time required for the hearing and appeal
cannot be considered "delay," since it is time required to effectuate a
fourth amendment policy of deterrence. 23
Fifth, although in terms of a policy of deterrence no distinction
can be made between victims in offensive and defensive postures, 124
such a distinction does make sense when it is recognized that applying
the exclusionary rule in a particular case involves the balancing of
social interests. While notions of judicial integrity may no longer be
the primary justification for the exclusionary rule, 25 the court's role
in a particular case is an appropriate factor to consider when drawing
lines. Thus, a court may rationally decide to lend its aid neither to a
victim who desires to exclude illegally obtained evidence, nor to the
government which wishes to force a victim to testify on the basis of
evidence illegally obtained from him.
120 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
3.1 Id. at 97.
122 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
123 See In re Callandra, 332 F. Supp. 737, 74041 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
124 See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
12 5 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 414-15 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Sixth, failure to allow witnesses to rely on the exclusionary rule
will result in at least some additional harm to them resulting directly
from the initial constitutional and statutory violations. In addition to
being merely offensive to the witness, forced disclosure may lead to a
damaged reputation with unpredictable future consequences.
CONCLUSION
The plain words of section 2515 of the Safe Streets Act can clearly
support a construction preventing government questioning of witnesses
based on information obtained by unauthorized electronic surveillance
directed against them. Nevertheless that construction is questionable
because other sections of the Act, particularly section 2518(10) (a)
and the legislative history, indicate that Congress intended to allow
motions to suppress only when the victim becomes a litigant in an
adversary hearing. But, even if title III is construed not to allow grand
jury witnesses to challenge the source of government questioning, fed-
eral courts are not precluded from reaching the Egan and Evans result.
These courts are independently obligated to give the fourth amendment
"force and effect," 128 while the Supreme Court has independent super-
visory powers over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts.127 The case for judicial deference to Congressional standing
limitations in this area is weak, if, as the legislative history suggests,
Congress merely attempted to embody what the courts had already
decided. 2 s
Balancing deterrence gains against criminal conviction losses in
the Egan and Evans situation, in which government use of illegal
electronic surveillance is involved, several considerations are relevant
and tend to support the results reached in those cases.
The exclusionary rule remains the primary instrument which
courts can use to deter surreptitious and deliberate violations of fourth
amendment rights. Allowing witnesses Egan and Evans to challenge
the source of government questioning does not run afoul of the theo-
retical underpinnings of the standing requirement-fourth amendment
rights cannot be vicariously asserted. It does prevent courts from
actively abetting illegal conduct. It also prevents the inflicting of
further harm on the victims of calculated invasions of privacy. At the
same time, the availability to witnesses of exclusionary rule claims will
not unduly interfere with court or grand jury proceedings in which the
government is able to refute the charge of electronic surveillance or to
demonstrate compliance with title III's procedural requirements, or in
cases where the government does not try to elicit information from the
aggrieved person himself. In other cases, responsibility for the inter-
126 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1913).
127 See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
128 See note 82 .upra.
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ference will be the prosecutor's rather than the court's. Under title III
prosecuting attorneys have the power and responsibility to demand
strict compliance with title III's procedures. 29
129 Only persons designated by the United States Attorney General or the prin-
cipal prosecuting attorney of a state may authorize wiretap applications. 18 U.S.C.
§2516(1), (2) (1970).
